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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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In the mid-2000s, India began rolling out large-scale, 
publicly-financed health insurance schemes mostly 
targeting the poor. This paper describes and analyzes 
Andhra Pradesh’s Aarogyasri scheme, which covers 
against the costs of around 900 high-cost procedures 
delivered in secondary and tertiary hospitals. Using a 
new household survey, the authors find that 80 percent 
of families are eligible, equal to about 68 million people, 
and 85 percent of these families know they are covered; 
only one-quarter, however, know that the benefit 
package is limited. The study finds that, contrary to the 
rules of the program, patients incur quite large out-of-
pocket payments during inpatient episodes thought to 
be covered by Aarogyasri. In the absence of data and 
program design features that would allow for a rigorous 
impact evaluation, a comparison is made between Andhra 
Pradesh and neighboring Maharashtra over an eight-year 
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of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy 
discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
The authors may be contacted at awagstaff@worldbank.org.
period spanning the scheme’s introduction. During this 
period, Maharashtra did not introduce any at-scale health 
initiative that was not also introduced in Andhra Pradesh. 
Andhra Pradesh other health initiatives were considerably 
less ambitious and costly than Aarogyasri. The paper 
finds that Andhra Pradesh recorded faster growth than 
Maharashtra (even after adjusting for confounders) in 
inpatient admissions per capita (for all income groups) 
and in surgery admissions (among the poor only), slower 
growth in out-of-pocket payments for inpatient care 
(in total and per admission, but only among the better 
off), and slower growth in transport and outpatient out-
of-pocket costs. The paper argues that these results are 
consistent with Aarogyasri having the intended effects, 
but also with minor health initiatives in Andhra Pradesh 
(especially the ambulance program) playing a role. 
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1. Introduction  
Low and middle income countries – and some high income countries too – are 
in the midst of a major push toward providing coverage against the costs of health 
care for a larger share of population, especially those toward the bottom of the 
income distribution.1 Key differences across such initiatives include: the section of 
the population that is covered; the range of services that are covered and the 
financial coverage; how the target population enrolls and how much they pay – if 
anything – to enroll; the methods used to make the newly covered population aware 
of their entitlements and to ensure beneficiary rights are enforced; the size of any 
co-payments levied at the point of use; the network of providers that deliver the 
services and how they are selected and de-selected; and the governance and 
‘purchasing’ arrangements that are put in place to ensure that services are 
delivered efficiently and at a high quality.  
In this paper we describe and analyze an innovative government-sponsored 
health insurance program in India known as the Rajiv Aarogyasri Community 
Health Insurance scheme, referred to below simply as Aarogyasri. Historically, 
India has financed a large share of its health spending through out-of-pocket 
payments, and the health budget share and incidence of catastrophic and/or 
impoverishing health spending have been high by international standards.2,3 Prior 
1 The World Bank has recently published 22 case studies of such initiatives: 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/health/publication/universal-health-coverage-study-series.  
2 Data from the World Health Organization for 2011 put India’s share at 59 percent. Of the 148 countries for which WHO has 
data, only 16 have a higher percentage than India. All – with the exception of Singapore – are low-income countries. Source: 
http://apps.who.int/nha/database/DataExplorer.aspx?ws=0&d=1 (consulted September 10, 2013).  
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to the mid-2000s, efforts to make health care affordable centered around 
community-based health insurance (CBHI) schemes, often linked to non-
government organizations.4 In the light of the disappointing results and limited 
scalability of CBHI initiatives in India (and elsewhere), a few Indian states, notably 
Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, began to set up their own 
government-sponsored health insurance programs; the national government, 
through the Ministry of Labour and Employment, also developed the RSBY 
program.5  
Aarogyasri has a number of interesting features. It targets poor households; 
however, due to Andhra Pradesh’s (AP’s) high poverty line, the state government 
claims that in practice most of the population is covered. Aarogyasri focuses on 
hospital care, and largely on tertiary hospital care. This is the exact opposite 
approach of most other publicly financed health insurance schemes around the 
world, where the benefit package is usually based explicitly on cost-effectiveness 
criteria; the result is that highly cost-effective (often low cost) interventions are 
covered, but cost-ineffective interventions (often high cost) are not. Aarogyasri’s 
rationale for focusing on tertiary procedures is partly that many cost-effective 
3 Van Doorslaer et al. (2007) find that out-of-pocket spending absorbs nearly five percent of total household expenditure in 
India; in Asia, only Bangladesh and Vietnam record higher fractions. They also find that nearly 10 percent of Indian 
households spend more than 25 percent of their nonfood spending on health care; only Bangladesh, China and Vietnam record 
higher percentages. Van Doorslaer et al. (2006) also find that India fares worse in terms of the degree to which out-of-pocket 
spending impoverishes households. At the international dollar-a-day poverty line, health expenses add 3.7 percentage points 
to the poverty headcount; in Asia, only Bangladesh records a higher increase.  
4 Few have been subjected to a rigorous evaluation. Ranson (2002) evaluates the Self Employed Women's Association's 
Medical Insurance Fund in Gujarat but uses a simple comparison between outcomes at one point in time among those in the 
scheme and those not in it. Aggarwal (2010) evaluates the Yeshasvini community-based health insurance program; the 
method again involves comparisons at one point in time between participants and non-participants, although in this case 
participants and non-participants are matched using propensity score matching.  
5 La Forgia and Nagpal (2012) provide a comprehensive review of the various government-sponsored health insurance 
schemes that have sprouted up India in the last decade. Palacios et al. (2011) cover several angles of the RSBY scheme.  
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procedures are already supposedly covered by India’s vertical programs and system 
for primary care, but mainly that it wanted to give patients the opportunity to 
receive interventions that could prevent the loss of life or disablement of a 
breadwinner without forcing households into – or further into – poverty. As the 
Aarogyasri Trust (the body tasked with overseeing the program) put it in its 2011-
2012 annual report, one of the scheme’s objectives is “to cover catastrophic illnesses 
which will have the potential to wipe out a life time savings of poor families.”6  
Aarogyasri is unusual in other respects too. It claims its methods to make the 
population aware of their coverage and entitlements have been highly successful – a 
claim we test below. Aarogyasri levies no co-payments at the point of use for covered 
procedures, and providers are not supposed to balance-bill; patients are supposed, 
in fact, to sign a document upon discharge confirming they have not paid any out-of-
pocket payment whatsoever. Aarogyasri relies entirely on general revenues (at the 
state level) for finance, and there are no enrollment costs. Nor is there any 
enrollment process: enrollment is automatic for those with the below-poverty line 
(BPL) card. Aarogyasri has a sophisticated set of arrangements under which 
hospitals – from both the public and private sectors – can apply to become 
empanelled, but not all those who apply are empanelled; hospitals that are too 
small (fewer than 50 beds), for example, cannot be empanelled. Once empanelled a 
hospital in AP can be dis-empanelled by Aarogyasri if its performance falls short of 
the standards laid down in the contract.  
6 http://www.aarogyasri.gov.in/ASRI/EXT_IMAGES/documents/Annual_Report_201112.pdf  
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Aarogyasri also has an elaborate set of governance arrangements: a board of 
trustees with representatives from across government; a staff that operates a 
complex pre-screening and verification process underpinned by a sophisticated IT 
system; a system of payment settlement with empanelled hospitals that is 
electronic and swift, based on a fixed per-procedure price schedule; a call center that 
not only receives calls from patients but also makes calls to check up on patients 
after discharge; and a network of ancillary health workers known as 
“Aarogyamitras” whose role is to help the patient through her hospitalization 
episode, starting before the admission, through the admission itself, to 
convalescence at home. In the absence of such arrangements, it is possible that 
providers may – depending on how they are compensated by the scheme – deliver 
extra care irrespective of whether it is needed or more expensive care irrespective of 
whether it is cost-effective. This would appear to be part of the reason for the failure 
of China’s subsidized health insurance schemes to reduce out-of-pocket spending 
(Wagstaff and Lindelow 2008; Wagstaff, Lindelow, Gao, Xu and Qian 2009; Hou, 
Van de Poel, Van Doorslaer, Yu and Meng 2013).7 Or if providers are allowed to set 
prices and balance-bill, they may respond to insurance by raising the price-cost 
margin to insured patients, extracting the same out-of-pocket payments as before 
from the patient, and getting the payout from the insurer as well; this seems to 
have happened in the Philippines (Gertler and Solon 2002).  
7 Indonesia’s Askeskin program also seems to have raised out-of-pocket spending, at least in urban areas (Sparrow, Suryahadi 
and Widyanti 2013).  
                                                 
6 
 
Despite its innovativeness, Aarogyasri has been the subject of relatively few 
studies. Rao et al. (2011) undertook a rapid assessment in 2008, and Reddy and 
Mary (2013) analyzed information from Aarogyasri and media to assess how public 
funds are used in the program.8  Fan et al. (2012), by contrast, assess the impacts of 
the program. They exploit the staggered roll-out of the scheme across AP districts 
over the period April 1 2007 to July 17 2008, and use data from the consumer 
expenditure survey (CES) to compare – for each of three years (1999–2000, 2004–
2005, and 2007–2008) – households in AP districts with the Aarogyasri scheme and 
households in AP and non-AP districts without it. None of the districts had 
implemented the scheme when the first two surveys were conducted, but some AP 
districts had implemented it for at least part of the period covered by the third 
survey, and it is this variation that allows the authors to identify the effects of the 
program. The study concluded that Aarogyasri had significantly reduced out-of-
pocket inpatient expenditures and, to a lesser extent, outpatient expenditures, but 
that the benefits if Aarogyasri were not shared equally across the population, with 
scheduled caste and scheduled tribe households benefitting less. The study by Fan 
et al. does have some limitations. It does not provide survey-based evidence on 
coverage and targeting, or on people’s perceptions and understanding of Aarogyasri. 
Moreover, due to the limited scope of the CES, the study focuses exclusively on out-
of-pocket spending, and therefore does not shed light on the extent to which 
Aarogyasri has affected use of services, cost-per-admission, length of stay, or the use 
8 Rao et al. (2011) found that the most common condition covered by Aarogyasri was cardiac, few people who were supposed to 
go for follow-up visits actually did so, and people that had benefitted from Aarogyasri still ended up paying large amounts for 
medicine. Reddy and Mary (2013) reviewed the expenditure of Aarogyasri on private vs. public hospitals and drew the 
conclusion that the program is not financially sustainable.  
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of private or public providers; nor does it show the impact the program has on how 
households finance expensive hospital care. In addition, at the time of the survey 
used by Fan et al., Aarogyasri had only been active for a few months.9 The only 
other study to analyze Aarogyasri is that of Rao et al. (2014) who report some early 
results from the study on which the present paper is based using the same data and 
similar methods. That analysis is, however, considerably more limited than this 
paper. Not only do we use survey data to compare the theory and practice of 
Aarogyasri, we analyze many more outcomes (25 compared to just four in Rao et 
al.), and explore the sensitivity of the two threshold-based outcomes (‘large’ out-of-
pocket spending and ‘large’ borrowing) to the choice of threshold (we explore seven 
different thresholds) while Rao et al. use just one threshold for each indicator.  
As well as describing Aarogyasri in some detail, we report two types of 
analysis of it. First, we report descriptive statistics from a household survey 
conducted in AP specifically to analyze the scheme. Through these data we are able 
to shed light on issues such as coverage and targeting, and people’s understanding 
and use of the scheme. Second, in the absence of data and program design features 
that would allow for a rigorous impact evaluation covering several outcomes and 
allowing for a reasonable delay before impacts become felt, we try to get some 
insights into the effects of Aarogyasri by comparing changes in AP with changes in 
neighboring Maharashtra (MH) over the period 2004 (three years before 
9 Factoring in which districts acquired Aarogyasri when, the distribution of the AP population across districts, and the 
distribution of CES interviews across the 12 months, we estimate that sampled households living in an Aarogyasri district 
had benefitted from the program for an average of just 3.2 months, with only three percent of surveyed households having had 
at least a year of exposure. 
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Aarogyasri) to 2012 (four years after its introduction). Over this period, as we show 
below, MH did not introduce any at-scale health initiative that was not also 
introduced in AP (both introduced national initiatives); the initiatives MH did 
introduce (including health insurance schemes) were tiny in scale, with population 
coverage rates in single digits. Moreover, while AP did introduce some health 
initiatives beyond Aarogyasri over this period, Aarogyasri was by far the most 
important in resource terms, and in terms of likely impacts on the outcomes we 
analyze. To try to pin down the role of Aarogyasri as best we can, we also include in 
our analysis household-level influences on outcomes that may have changed 
differently between AP and MH. We should emphasize, however, that this analysis 
is not a rigorous impact evaluation, and we interpret our results as simply 
suggestive of Aarogyasri effects.  
From our survey, we find that 80 percent of families in AP are eligible for 
Aarogyasri, and 70 percent of families in our survey said they were covered; of 
these, 96 percent had a white card – a card issued to families living below the 
poverty line.10 Some families may, of course, acquire knowledge of coverage only 
when they seek health care, so the true coverage rate may well be closer to the 
claimed rate of 86 percent. While the benefit packages is limited to less than 1,000 
high-cost procedures, we find that only one quarter of the households who said they 
were covered by Aarogyasri were aware of this fact; as many as 60 percent of those 
who said they were covered said that the scheme “covers all health issues”. We also 
10 It is important to recognize that there are many ‘bogus’ white cards. The civil supplies department in AP estimated at least 
5 million cards to be fraudulent: see “Report on the State of Andhra Pradesh”, Central Vigilance Committee on Public 
Distribution System, July 2009, available at http://pdscvc.nic.in/AP%20report.htm.  
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find that while the scheme explicitly bars any out-of-pocket payments during an 
Aarogyasri-covered episode, patients in fact incurred quite high levels of out-of-
pocket spending (INR 16,000 on average, around $US 300) during inpatient 
episodes that they understood to be covered by the scheme. Our survey reveals that, 
contrary to the rules of the program, cash was provided for transportation home in 
only a minority (43 percent) of inpatient spells that the respondent claimed to be 
covered by Aarogyasri. Among the families in our survey who said they were 
covered by Aarogyasri, 62 percent said they had some understanding of the scheme, 
but among these only 16 percent had heard about ‘Aarogyamithras’, health workers 
employed to help people navigate Aarogyasri, and less than three percent had 
interacted with one. Of those in our survey who said they had been hospitalized the 
last year and had also benefitted somehow from Aarogyasri during the same period, 
only 12 percent had received a call from the Aarogyasri call center. Among all 
families knowledgeable about the Aarogyasri scheme, only 19 percent had heard 
about the call center and only one percent had actually called it. Our survey 
suggests that patients benefitting from Aarogyasri were just as satisfied with the 
quality of services as people not benefitting, and that Aarogyasri patients were just 
as likely (90 percent) to be asked to sign a consent form before surgery as non-
Aarogyasri patients (signing is a requirement for reimbursement purposes under 
the Aarogyasri scheme).  
In terms of possible effects of the Aarogyasri, we find that AP recorded faster 
growth than MH (even after adjusting for confounders) in inpatient admissions per 
10 
 
capita and in surgery admissions; the former increased faster across the board, the 
latter only among the poor. The faster growth in AP is consistent with Aarogyasri 
increasing the demand for inpatient care, but may also reflect the effects of 
ambulance program that AP introduced (and which MH did not). We find that AP 
recorded slower growth in out-of-pocket payments for inpatient care (in total and 
per admission), although only among the better off. The slower growth in AP in 
inpatient out-of-pocket spending is consistent with Aarogyasri reducing patient 
inpatient costs as intended, but may also reflect increased hospital competition in 
AP, and Aarogyasri shifting hospital casemix towards simpler cases by encouraging 
people to seek treatment at an earlier stage in their illness; the fact that we find AP 
reduced inpatient days faster than MH is consistent with this. We find that 
transportation costs fell in AP but grew in MH; this likely reflects in part AP’s 
ambulance program, but may also reflect Aarogyasri’s policy of contributing toward 
the patient’s transport costs home. Finally, we find that in AP outpatient out-of-
pocket expenditures fell while they increased in MH; this may reflect people in AP 
obtaining some outpatient care for free through Aarogyasri health camps, but more 
likely it reflects people in AP seeking inpatient care for conditions that previously 
they would have sought outpatient care for.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the central 
features of Aarogyasri, and compares the “theory” of the program, as set out in 
official documents and the program’s website, and the “practice” revealed through 
our household survey. Section 3 explains the methods we use to try to shed some 
11 
 
light on Aarogyasri’s effects, section 4 outlines the data we use, and section 5 
presents our results. Section 6 presents our conclusions.  
2. Aarogyasri: Theory and practice 
Launched by the AP state government in 2007, Aarogyasri is a government-
sponsored health insurance program that has inspired many other government-
sponsored insurance programs in India (La Forgia and Nagpal 2012). In this 
section, we describe the “theory” of the program highlighting its unique features. 
Using data drawn largely from a representative survey11 of 8,623 AP households 
that we fielded in 2012, but also from the Aarogyasri Trust and the AP government, 
we also present descriptive statistics that shed light on how Aarogyasri works in 
practice. Table 1 collects the various descriptive statistics from our household 
survey that we refer to in this section.  
2.1. Origins, goals and management 
The aim of Aarogyasri is to make hospitalization and treatment for serious 
life-threatening conditions affordable to households living below the poverty line. 
The scheme’s rationale for focusing on tertiary procedures is that it wanted to give 
patients services that could prevent the loss of life, severe disablement and major 
health care expenditures pushing households into – or further into – poverty. As the 
11 The survey was fielded between June and September 2012. The design was based on the National Sample Survey 
Organization’s (NSSO) socio-economic survey 60th round (2004-05) that covered morbidity and health care. We included the 
same questions and adopted the same multi-stage stratified sampling methodology. However, our ‘First Stage Units’ (FSUs) 
were those used by NSSO in their 66th round (2008-09) because rapid urbanization has changed the urban-rural landscape of 
both states and thus the geographical rationale for sampling units. We also added questions for AP households about the 
Aarogyasri program and other relevant programs.  
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Aarogyasri Trust (the body established to oversee the program) put it in its 2011-
2012 annual report, one of the scheme’s objectives is “to cover catastrophic illnesses 
which will have the potential to wipe out a life time savings of poor families.”12  
The Aarogyasri Trust was created to design and ensure implementation of 
Aarogyasri. The CEO of the Trust is always a civil servant and the Trust has more 
than 150 employees managing the program.13 The Trust is overseen by a Board of 
Trustees, chaired by the Chief Minister of the State and with Secretaries (senior 
civil servants) of relevant government departments as members. Initially the Trust 
contracted a private insurer through a competitive bidding process to perform most 
of the scheme’s management functions. However, in 2011 the Board of Trustees 
decided that most management responsibilities should be taken over by the Trust.  
2.2. Target population and enrollment process 
AP began introducing Aarogyasri from April 2007 onwards, and within 16 
months all districts were covered. The government claims that the program covers 
72 million people, 86 percent of AP families, and is designed to mainly target poor 
households. It is important to note that AP has a relatively generous poverty line: 
INR 60,000 per year and family (around $US 1,000) in rural areas and INR 75,000 
in urban areas.14 Aarogyasri also aims to cover some families above the poverty 
line, notably those carrying an Annapurna card, an Anthyodaya Anna Yojana card, 
12 http://www.aarogyasri.gov.in/ASRI/EXT_IMAGES/documents/Annual_Report_201112.pdf.  
13 The Aarogyasri Trust has a couple of hundred people managing support services such as the call center and has contracted 
an agency to manage more than 3,000 health workers, ‘Aarogyamithras’, in all networked hospitals and primary care centers 
of the government, on behalf of Aarogyasri Trust.  
14 The Planning Commission in 2011-12 estimated the poverty line in AP to be INR 860 per capita per month in rural areas 
and 1,009 in urban areas: see “Press Note on Poverty Estimates, 2011-12”, Government of India, Planning Commission, July 
2013, available at http://planningcommission.nic.in/news/pre_pov2307.pdf. Given an average family size of 3.9 in AP, this 
translates into an annual poverty line per family of INR 40,248 in rural areas and INR 47,221 in urban areas.  
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or a Journalist card. There have been talks of aiming at “universal coverage of the 
population” in the long-run.15 For now, Aarogyasri automatically enrolls households 
with any of the eligible cards and there is no cost to families to be enrolled.   
As families are supposed to be automatically covered by Aarogyasri if they 
hold a BPL card, or any of the other recognized cards, it is worth asking how many 
people have these cards, and how many people are aware that they are covered by 
the program. We find (see Table 1) that 71 percent of AP households (6,143 out of 
8,623 households) consider themselves to be covered by Aarogyasri. Among those 
who hold a card that entitles them to the program, about 85 percent considered 
themselves covered (5,805 out of 6,848 households); among the poorest 20 percent, 
the rate is 88 percent. Some families may, of course, acquire knowledge of coverage 
only when they seek health care, so the true coverage rate may well be much closer 
to the 86 percent claimed in the Annual Report. 
2.3. Efforts to raise awareness and use of the program  
As Aarogyasri is an important program for the ruling party, it has been 
marketed intensively during election periods and there are frequent advertisements 
in newspapers aimed at raising awareness of the program.   
The Trust has also introduced several initiatives to raise awareness 
especially among families in rural areas. One such initiative is health camps, which 
initially at least were intended to be conducted by every networked hospital 
following a protocol laid down by the Aarogyasri Trust. Initially running at the rate 
15 http://www.aarogyasri.gov.in/ASRI/EXT_IMAGES/documents/Annual_Report_201112.pdf .  
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of 1,700 per month these camps have also been used for basic health checks with 
free over-the-counter medicine and to screen the population for conditions 
(“ailments”) that can be treated with support from Aarogyasri. More than 35,950 
camps have been conducted since the start of the program. In December 2012, as 
awareness was considered to be high, the number of health camps was reduced, and 
are conducted through public primary health care centers at the rate of 30 camps 
per month in each district (about 460 per month).16  
To ascertain the degree of awareness of Aarogyasri among the population, we 
asked the respondent in our survey whether they considered themselves 
“knowledgeable” about Aarogyasri: 57 percent of the sample said they were (see 
Table 1). This rate was slightly higher (61 percent) among those reporting being 
covered by Aarogyasri. We also asked about health camps: among the families who 
were covered by and knowledgeable about Aarogyasri, 22 percent said they were 
aware of the health camps, and 11 percent had attended one.17  
We can get at whether efforts to raise awareness have translated into people 
accessing the program through the vast amounts of data that Aarogyasri collects 
through its field staff and networked hospitals. The Aarogyasri website reports 
information about the number of people hospitalized through the program, the 
patient’s condition, and the amounts paid to each hospital. These data show that in 
16 Information taken from minutes from meetings of the Board of Trustees of Aarogyasri available at 
https://www.aarogyasri.gov.in/ASRI/FrontServlet?requestType=CommonRH&actionVal=RightFrame&page=%3Cb%3EDR%3
C/b%3E&pageName=DR&mainMenu=Home&subMenu=Documents-and-Reports (consulted April 5, 2014). 
17 The Aarogyasri Trust reports that 2.3 percent of people treated in 2012 with support from Aarogyasri have been referred 
from a health camp.  
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2012, 434,000 people were admitted to hospital for an intervention that was paid for 
by Aarogyasri. We can cross-check this figure with our survey. There we find that 
11.3 percent of admissions were considered by respondents to have been covered by 
Aarogyasri. With the number of admissions averaging 5.5 per capita in our sample, 
this translates into about 520,000 Aarogyasri-covered admissions in 2012. The 
discrepancy, which is not large, may be due to some admissions not being covered 
by Aarogyasri despite the household thinking so; this would be consistent with the 
fact that, as we report below, we find some patients reporting out-of-pocket 
expenses and not receiving transport subsidies for admissions that they thought 
were covered by Aarogyasri.  
2.4. Intervention coverage  
Aarogyasri focuses on around 900 infrequent high-cost procedures delivered 
by secondary and tertiary hospitals. The number of procedures covered by 
Aarogyasri grew from 166 in 2007 to 938 in 2012.18 The Trust argues that these 
procedures cover “all major diseases”. It favors procedures that are high-cost (in the 
Trust’s words “have the potential to wipe out a life time savings of poor families”), 
require hospitalization in a secondary or tertiary hospital, and have an agreed 
clinical protocol. Explicitly excluded from the list are high-end procedures such as 
hip- and knee-replacement, bone morrow, cardiac and liver transplantations, 
gamma-knife procedures in neurosurgery, and assisted devices for cardiac failures. 
Also excluded are procedures related to diseases covered by national programs, such 
18 Information taken from minutes from meetings of the Board of Trustees of Aarogyasri available at 
https://www.aarogyasri.gov.in/ASRI/FrontServlet?requestType=CommonRH&actionVal=RightFrame&page=%3Cb%3EDR%3
C/b%3E&pageName=DR&mainMenu=Home&subMenu=Documents-and-Reports (consulted April 5, 2014). 
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as TB, HIV/AIDS, leprosy, infectious diseases, malaria, Filariasis, gastroenteritis, 
and jaundice. Deliveries are not covered but many complications of labor are 
covered. 
Despite Aarogyasri’s limited benefit package, only one-quarter of households 
in our survey who said they were covered by and knowledgeable about Aarogyasri 
were aware of this fact (see Table 1). As many as 60 percent of those who said they 
were covered by and knowledgeable about the program said (incorrectly) that it 
“covers all health issues”; the remaining 14 percent said they were unsure whether 
the program “covers all types of treatments”.  
2.5. Financial coverage and co-payments 
Aarogyasri covers hospital expenses up to an annual ceiling equal to INR 
200,000 (around US $3,700) per family. The treatments that are covered by the 
program must be provided free charge to the patient and Aarogyasri Trust pays 
hospitals a fixed amount per covered procedure. The rate paid includes not only 
costs incurred during the hospitalization but also medicines for 10 days after 
hospitalization and INR 1,000 subsidy for transportation. Hospitals will also have 
to meet the costs of readmissions within 12 days. For selected procedures requiring 
major medical treatment after hospitalizations, hospitals are also required to cover 
the costs of medicine for one year after the hospitalizations. There are still major 
challenges with this as many people travel long distances for the hospitalization 
while they are unable to travel the same distance for the follow-up visits and 
medicines. The prices for procedures covered by Aarogyasri were proposed by a 
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small group of specialists and approved by the Board of Trustees. Hospital 
associations became more active, as a response to Aarogyasri, to negotiate prices 
with the government. A challenge for Aarogyasri in managing these negotiations is 
a lack of data on costs of care for transparent price-setting; Aarogyasri has therefore 
initiated a study of costs in public and private hospitals.  
The patient is supposed to sign a declaration for the Trust to the effect that 
they have not been asked to pay anything out-of-pocket. This provision was 
considered essential because patients in India’s government-run health facilities 
have found themselves making payments for products and services in what is 
supposed to be a system that delivers care that is free at the point of use.19 
Transactions in the Aarogyasri program are intended to be completely cashless – 
the patient does not have to pay upfront and then claim reimbursement. In 
addition, the patient receives medicine for ten days after discharge and subsidy of 
INR 1,000 toward the cost of transport to and from the hospital; this is enforced 
through a photograph upon discharge of the patient, the treating physician, and the 
responsible health worker or ‘Aarogyamithra’ (see below).  
In our household survey, we asked respondents who had benefitted from 
Aarogyasri if they had incurred any expenditure. We found that patients incurred 
quite high levels of out-of-pocket spending during inpatient episodes that they 
understood to be covered by Aarogyasri. Among respondents who said their family 
19 Payments could be for medicines required but not available in the government hospital, or other incidental costs or informal 
payments. 
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and the inpatient episode were covered by the program, the average out-of-pocket 
spending per episode was INR 16,019 (see Table 1). There are various possible 
explanations of this. It may, for example, be that patients pay for diagnostic tests 
before they are admitted. Or it may be they are admitted to hospital for a covered 
procedure but end up paying for uncovered procedures. It is also common that 
families have to pay for medicine outside of the hospital even during a treatment. 
Our data show that the average amount paid for medicine outside of the hospital 
during a treatment funded by Aarogyasri was INR 5,204.  
Our survey also reveals some divergence between the principle and practice 
of transportation subsidies. Our data show (see Table 1) that cash was provided for 
transportation home in a minority (43 percent) of inpatient spells that the 
respondent had understood to be covered by Aarogyasri. One possibility is that the 
amount provided is not sufficient to cover the entire transport cost. Another is that 
the patient may be misremembering. It may also, of course, be the case that the 
patient simply did not receive the subsidy as required by the program.  
2.6. Efforts to ensure beneficiaries’ rights are enforced  
The Aarogyasri program includes a number of unique features to mitigate 
fraud, raise awareness of the program, and to get feedback from people covered by 
the program. One such feature is the call center. The Aarogyasri call center receives 
calls from anyone with complaints about the program or wanting general 
information about the program such as where the closest network hospital is 
located, what services the hospitals provide and how many available beds the 
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different hospitals have. In our survey, we found that among all families 
knowledgeable about and covered by Aarogyasri, 19 percent had heard about the 
call center, but only one percent had actually called it (see Table 1).  
Most of the Aarogyasri program’s call center calls are actually outgoing calls 
– to coordinate with “Aarogyamithras” (see below) and contact patients who have 
received treatment funded by the program to remind them about follow-up 
treatments, check on the welfare, and on their receipt of medicines after discharge 
from hospital. Among those in our sample who said they had been hospitalized in 
the last year and had benefitted from Aarogyasri, 12 percent say they had received 
a call from the call center.  
In 2011 it was decided that Aarogyasri Trust should take over another help 
line / call center (known as the “104 call center”) that provides advice on preventive 
and primary health care services. Algorithms guide the call center staff, and a panel 
of doctors is available to give advice when needed. The center was initiated as a 
public-private partnership in 2009 inspired by a public-private partnership for 
ambulance services in AP (see Table 2). In our survey data, awareness about the 
“104” help-line was much higher (76 percent of respondents) than about the 
Aarogyasri call center (19 percent of people knowledgeable and covered by 
Aarogyasri)(see Table 1).  
Aarogyasri uses another instrument to ensure the covered population 
benefits from the program: it employs more than 3,000 ancillary health workers 
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known as “Aarogyamithras” (or “friends of health”) who support patients at all 
government-run primary health centers and in all hospitals contracted by the 
program. Aarogyamithras in primary health care centers are responsible for raising 
awareness about the Aarogyasri program in the community, while those working in 
contracted hospitals are responsible for guiding patients through the treatment 
process and collecting feedback. Among the surveyed families who said they were 
covered by and knowledgeable about Aarogyasri, 16 percent had heard about 
Aarogyamithras, but only 3 percent had ever interacted with one.  
The Aarogyasri Trust sends a letter from the Chief Minister to every person 
who has benefitted from the program. The letter encourages the patients to send a 
reply with feedback about the treatment. In our survey data, we found that only 23 
percent of people treated through Aarogyasri reported receiving the letter. 
2.7. Public financing  
Aarogyasri is entirely publicly financed, with the resources coming from the 
state government. In 2011-2012 the AP government spent INR 10.3 billion (around 
US $ 190 million) on Aarogyasri, equivalent to INR 400 per family in the state, INR 
140 per capita, and INR 137 per person covered.20 Since 2008 Aarogyasri has 
absorbed 15-23 percent of AP’s health budget (see Figure 1) (Nagulapalli and 
Rokkam 2013).  
The AP government introduced a “sin tax” on alcohol to fund Aarogyasri, but 
this additional revenue in practice covers only a small portion of the cost. Health 
20 Based on 2011 census data.  
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expenditure as a share of all government expenditures in the state increased from 
3.4 percent in 2007 to 4.3 percent in 2011, most of this increase being attributable 
to Aarogyasri.  
2.8. The network of providers that deliver the services 
Reflecting its secondary and tertiary care-oriented benefit package, 
Aarogyasri contracts secondary and tertiary hospitals with at least 50 beds, both 
public and private. Aarogyasri has an aggressive approach to empaneling and 
disempaneling hospitals according to indicators of structure and process; over time 
Aarogyasri has become less evenhanded in its approach to the private and public 
sectors, deciding in 2011 to reserve 133 procedures exclusively for reimbursements 
in public hospitals.21   
Any public or private hospital with 50 beds or more can submit an online 
application to the Aarogyasri Trust to become an empanelled hospital. As of April 
2013, the network of empanelled hospitals included 271 private hospitals and 102 
government hospitals. The application has a standard format with a broad set of 
elements including mandatory approvals such as licenses, and details on equipment 
and human resources per the different specialties. After a successful submission, 
representatives from the Trust visit the hospital to verify the information. The 
number of hospitals in the network is constantly changing with Trust delisting and 
suspending hospitals that are not meeting the requirements such as the number of 
21 Information taken from minutes from meetings of the Board of Trustees of Aarogyasri available at 
https://www.aarogyasri.gov.in/ASRI/FrontServlet?requestType=CommonRH&actionVal=RightFrame&page=%3Cb%3EDR%3
C/b%3E&pageName=DR&mainMenu=Home&subMenu=Documents-and-Reports (consulted April 5, 2014). 
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health camps to be provided per month, charging patients when it is supposed to be 
cashless or different forms of fraud. 
According to Aarogyasri’s administrative data, about 30 percent of all 
admissions supported by the program in 2012 occurred in the public sector. In our 
survey, 32 percent of admissions thought by the patient to have been covered by 
Aarogyasri occurred in a government hospital – very similar to the figure from the 
official Aarogyasri records. It is sometimes claimed that Aarogyasri is biased toward 
the private sector, a belief that led to the aforementioned decision to reserve 133 
procedures for exclusive delivery by the public sector; interestingly, our data show 
that that the public share of non-Aarogyasri admissions is even lower at just 23 
percent.  
2.9. Claims management  
Aarogyasri has an elaborate claims management system. An individual who 
wants to benefit from the program must bring the card that verifies eligibility to a 
networked hospital (hospital that has been contracted by Aarogyasri) when seeking 
care; the hospital verifies that the person is the person whose picture appears on 
the card; the hospital scans the card, and sends the scanned image to the Trust for 
verification. It is not only eligibility that is verified by the Trust; hospitals have to 
upload the diagnosis with supporting documents such as lab results and images for 
authorization by a group of doctors at the Trust. This is generally done before the 
patient is admitted to the hospital.  
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Hospitals are reimbursed by Aarogyasri through a cashless system within 
seven days of the patient being discharged from hospital. A web-based system has 
been developed for efficient claims management. The system has direct links 
between pre-authorization, electronic patient records, claims review and bank 
transactions to hospitals. The data entered at the time of pre-authorization are 
reviewed and compared to the claims data from the hospital. If the patient has 
received the treatment previously authorized, the claims manager notifies the bank, 
an electronic payment is made to the hospital, and the hospital manager is notified 
via text message or email.   
2.10. Measures to counter fraud and assure quality   
Aarogyasri has a sophisticated pre-authorization process in which documents 
supporting the proposed procedure are submitted electronically by the hospital to 
the Aarogyasri Trust, scrutinized by an authorizations physician, and approved or 
rejected within 12 hours of submission. There are also efforts to introduce standard 
treatment guidelines to improve the quality of services.  
Fraud is one of Aarogyasri’s main challenges, and methods to detect and 
manage fraud are being developed and refined. For several years, Aarogyasri has 
listed on its website the hospitals that it has dis-empanelled, along with the 
reasons; financial fraud is one.  
Aarogyasri has recently invested in improving the quality of services in 
networked hospitals by advancing its accreditation standards. Aarogyasri – along 
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with most other government-sponsored health insurance programs in India – is 
reviewing its standards and exploring how to encourage hospitals to improve. 
Aarogyasri has announced that it will require all empanelled hospitals to be 
accredited by the National Board for Accreditation of Hospitals by 2015, which is a 
major commitment, as only 18 hospitals have managed to be accredited as of April, 
2014.   
The actual quality of services delivered by Aarogyasri is uncertain. We can 
get some insight into this from our survey, although the survey relies upon self-
reported information from patients. Respondents who had been hospitalized were 
asked if they were satisfied with the quality of services, the attitude of the staff, etc. 
There is no indication that patients whose episode was covered by Aarogyasri feel 
they received better or worse quality of services than people whose episode was not 
covered. Patients are supposed to sign a form of consent before surgery; this is a 
requirement by law, and also a requirement for reimbursement by Aarogyasri. Our 
survey suggests the likelihood of this happening is the same among Aarogyasri-
funded patients as among other patients, with close to 90 percent of patients being 
asked to sign the form in both groups.  
3. Assessing the effects of Aarogyasri: Methods  
To what extent has Aarogyasri succeeded in its aim of making hospitalization 
and treatment for serious life-threatening conditions affordable to AP families, 
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especially poor ones? In an ideal world, we would be able to estimate the impacts of 
the introduction of Aarogyasri on, say, hospitalization and out-of-pocket spending, 
and compare these impacts with the impacts of the introduction of an alternative 
program in a similar setting. Unfortunately neither the manner of the Aarogyasri 
rollout, nor the data that are available, permit such an analysis. The program was 
phased in across four groups of districts, but the districts acquiring the program 
first (on April 1 2007) did so only 16 months before the last group of districts 
acquired it (on July 17 2008). Had the CES been fielded in 2008-09 (it was not22), we 
could have combined the data with the data from the 2007-08 CES to obtain 24 
months of interviews with Aarogyasri exposure times ranging from zero to 27 
months, and almost 20 percent of the combined sample having one year’s worth of 
exposure. But even then we would have been able to look only at out-of-pocket 
spending, not the full range of outcomes we look at here. Nor can we exploit 
variation in Aarogyasri cover across individuals, in part because, as we have seen, 
most of the population is covered (and know it), and in part because people who do 
not know they are covered may simply wait until they seek care to establish it. 
Moreover, people who are not eligible for Aarogyasri have the option of financial 
support for inpatient care through the Chief Minister’s Relief Fund, so in effect the 
entire population is covered against the costs of secondary and tertiary care.  
What we can do is to compare changes in outcomes among AP residents after 
the introduction of Aarogyasri with changes recorded over the same period among a 
22 http://mospi.nic.in/Mospi_New/upload/nsso/ratelist_UnitData.pdf  
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comparable population elsewhere, i.e. a difference-in-difference approach. We can 
improve on this simple diff-in-diff approach by holding constant at the individual 
level factors that may both exert a potential influence on outcomes and grow 
differently between the AP population and the “control group”, and by running the 
model as a (district) fixed-effects model. Neither approach automatically identifies 
the effects of Aarogyasri, of course. Rather they identify AP’s excess growth in 
outcomes over and above the growth among the control group.  
Whether this excess growth estimate sheds any light on the effects of 
Aarogyasri depends on: (a) how well our covariates capture differential changes on 
outcomes attributable to influences other than state-level health initiatives; (b) how 
important Aarogyasri was among AP’s health initiatives; and (c) how far there were 
major health initiatives in the “control” area(s). On (a), we include standard 
covariates such as variables such as a proxy for living standards and a rural-urban 
dummy. On (b) and (c) we argue below that Aarogyasri was the most significant 
health initiative in AP, and that in the state that forms our control group – 
neighboring Maharashtra (MH) – there were only small-scale health initiatives 
other than national initiatives that affected both states equally. We believe 
therefore that our estimates of excess growth in AP do shed some light on the 
possible effects of Aarogyasri; that said, the results are suggestive of impact (or no 
impact), not conclusive.  
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3.1. Health initiatives in AP and MH 
Table 2 summarizes the various health initiatives of AP and MH over the 
period over which we analyze differential growth between the two states (2004-
2012).  
AP introduced Aarogyasri in 2007, and quickly reached about 80 percent 
population coverage (see Figure 2). As Table 2 shows, while MH has developed 
programs providing insurance against inpatient care costs, these have covered a 
tiny fraction of the population. Only in July 2012 did the government of MH decide 
to launch an Aarogyasri-type program (the Rajiv Gandhi Jeevandayee Arogya 
Yojana or RGJAY program): we estimate that in 2012 RGJAY covered just 0.04 
percent of inpatient admissions in MH; Aarogyasri, by contrast, covered more than 
11 percent of admissions in AP.23 RGJAY was predated by the Jeevandai Arogya 
Yojana program, which started in 1997 but which had the same financial coverage 
as RGJAY but operated at a very small scale, and by RSBY, a national insurance 
program that MH implemented in 32 districts between 2008 and 2011 but then 
scaled back to 26 districts as RGJAY was launched in six districts to replace RSBY 
(Thakur and Ghosh 2013). RSBY faced challenges in enrolling eligible families in 
MH, and in 2012 was only covering one percent of the MH population (Thakur and 
23 For MH calculated as 20,170 admissions paid for by RGJAY (available at http://maha-
arogya.gov.in/projectandschemes/Jeevandaiaarogya/performance.htm consulted on April 7, 2014) over admissions in the state 
in MH (0.05 times hospitalized per capita) as per our survey estimates. For AP calculated as 433,975 admissions paid for by 
Aarogyasri (available at 
https://www.aarogyasri.gov.in/ASRI/FrontServlet?requestType=CommonRH&actionVal=RightFrame&page=undefined%3E%3
E%3Cb%3EExplore-Data%3C/b%3E&pageName=Explore-Statistics&mainMenu=Home&subMenu=Explore-Data consulted 
on April 5, 2014) over number of admissions in the state (0.55 time hospitalized per capita) as per our survey estimates.  
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Ghosh, 2013). Figure 2 shows the trends in coverage of Aarogyasri, RGJAY and 
RSBY between April 2007 and April 2012.  
Table 2 also shows that beyond Aarogyasri, AP had three other health 
flagship programs: an ambulance service, mobile health units, and a health call 
center. MH had nothing similar to either of the first two in the period in question, 
and while MH did introduce a health call center, it did so only in 2011 (AP 
introduced its call center program in 2007). Table 2 also highlights two national 
health initiatives that are in both states, namely the Employees State Insurance 
Scheme (ESIS) and the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM). The first predates 
our “baseline” survey by many decades, and while the latter was introduced a year 
after our baseline survey, it is a program that is intended to be nationwide and to 
operate similarly across states. We have found only one health initiative in MH that 
was not also present in AP, namely MH’s Matrutva Anudan Yojana program; 
however, this was introduced 10 years before our baseline survey, and it is hard to 
see how it could account for any differential growth between AP and MH over the 
period in question.  
3.2. Models used to estimate AP’s excess growth  
A comparison of the health initiatives in the two states thus shows that 
Aarogyasri was at least one of AP’s key health initiatives over the period in 
question, if not the key initiative, and that MH did not introduce any significant at-
scale health initiatives that were not also introduced in AP. For some of our 
outcomes (e.g. transportation costs) we would expect AP initiatives other than 
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Aarogyasri (e.g. the ambulance service) to help explain differential growth between 
AP and MH. However, for others (e.g. length of inpatient stay) we think this less 
likely.  
Let yidt be the outcome of interest for individual i living in district d at time t, 
Xidt be a vector of covariates that are potentially correlated with outcomes and that 
may vary from one state to the other, and APidt take a value of one if individual i 
lives at time t in AP. The difference-in-difference estimator can be written:  
 (1) 𝑦𝑖𝑑𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 ∙ 2012𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑑𝑡 
where 2012t takes a value of 1 for data collected in 2012 and εidt is an idiosyncratic 
error term. Eqn (1) simply compares the change between 2004 and 2012 between 
the two states: the coefficient δ gives the additional increment (or decrement) in y in 
AP over and above that in MH, i.e. the “excess growth” (which could be negative) in 
AP. If, on balance, Aarogyasri and other initiatives implemented between 2004 and 
2012 in AP had the same effect on y as the various health initiatives implemented 
over the same period in MH, δ will be zero.  
Our second approach is to estimate a fixed effects model (with fixed effects for 
district and month) in which we also control for differential changes in observables 
between the two states. The model we estimate is:  
(2) 𝑦𝑖𝑑𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑑𝑡𝛾 + 𝛿𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑑 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑑𝑡,  
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where the Xidt are observable variables for individual i in district d at time t, αd and 
θt are the district and time fixed effects, and εidt is an idiosyncratic error term. The 
coefficient δ gives the excess growth in AP. We heed Angrist and Pishcke’s (2009 
p.94 ff) advice and use OLS rather than a limited dependent variable model in the 
case of binary outcomes. Throughout we adjust standard errors for clustering at the 
district level, and use sampling weights.24  
4. Assessing the effects of Aarogyasri: Data  
Our household data are for the states of AP and MH, and refer to the years 
2004 and 2012 – respectively three years before and five years after the start of the 
rollout of Aarogyasri. They come from two surveys: the 2004 National Sample 
Survey Organization (NSSO) Morbidity and Health Care Survey25; and our own 
survey which we conducted in MH and AP over the period June-September 2012. 
The MH and AP samples of the 2004 NSSO survey comprise 5,314 and 5,059 
households respectively. In our 2012 survey, we interviewed 10,073 households in 
MH and 8,623 households in AP. The NSSO survey contains quite detailed 
information on the use of health services and expenditures. We modeled our 
questionnaire for the 2012 survey on the NSSO questionnaire, but added questions, 
24 Certain criteria were used for selecting the survey households. All households in the first sample unit (FS) were listed and 
households then randomly selected as per the criteria. Multipliers, or weights, were then assigned to each household based on 
the characteristics of the first sample unit. This is to avoid the sample from being purposive. NSSO provided weights along 
with the unit level data for the 2004 data and we developed weights using the same method for our survey.  
25 The full title is National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) Socio-Economic Survey Sixtieth Round: January – June, 2004 
Schedule 25.0: Morbidity and Health Care.  
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including an entire section on the Aarogyasri program which was our source of 
microdata in section 2.  
4.1. Outcome variables  
Tables 3-5 report descriptive statistics for our outcome variables for AP and 
MH for 2004 and 2012, along with the change and difference in change (or diff-in-
diff). We wanted to capture the outcomes related to the main objectives of the 
Aarogyasri program. These include the use of health care services, broken down by 
inpatient versus outpatient, and in the case of an inpatient admission whether 
surgery was undertaken; where care was received (type and ownership of the 
facility); out-of-pocket expenditures (including whether expenditures are ‘large’); 
and what sources of funds the family used to pay for the hospitalizations 
(borrowing, contributions from friends and family, income or other sources).  
Our inpatient admission variable takes a value of one if the individual had at 
least one hospitalization in the previous year – the rate is lower in AP than MH, 
and in both states the rate has increased; AP recorded the larger percentage 
increase. We also measure the number of times a person was hospitalized in the last 
12 months; again both states have seen an increase, with AP overtaking MH and 
recording the larger percentage increase. Our surgery variable equals one if the 
individual had undergone surgery in the previous year – the fraction has increased 
in both states, and is higher now in AP; AP’s rate increased considerably faster than 
MH’s. We also have a series of hospitalization variables that capture whether or not 
the individual had been admitted to hospital for the various procedures that 
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Aarogyasri covers. We were limited to defining the conditions in our survey in the 
same way as the NSSO survey, with broad categories of conditions. Cardiac, cancer 
and kidney failure were the only three categories of conditions included in the 
NSSO survey for which Aarogyasri covers most procedures. These three conditions 
together represent 38 percent of all procedures covered by Aarogyasri, and for 49 
percent of Aarogyasri payments.26 Less than half of one percent of the population in 
AP is admitted to hospital with these conditions. The percentage of people admitted 
to hospital with an Aarogyasri-covered condition fell in MH but increased in AP. 
Our outpatient utilization variable takes a value of one if the individual had sought 
outpatient care in the previous 15 days. Outpatient utilization rates have 
apparently fallen in both states between 2004 and 2012. We also construct outcomes 
at the level of the hospital admission. For each admission, we construct a variable 
that captures the length of stay, and whether the care was delivered in a private 
facility. Length of stay has fallen in both states with AP recording the larger 
percentage fall, while admissions to private facilities have fallen in MH but have 
increased somewhat in AP.  
Our data allow us to measure inpatient expenses (net of reimbursements) 
incurred for each admission; we aggregate across admissions in each household to 
get total household inpatient expenditures. We adjust spending by the Consumer 
26 See 
https://www.aarogyasri.gov.in/ASRI/FrontServlet?requestType=CommonRH&actionVal=RightFrame&page=undefined%3E%3
E%3Cb%3EExplore-Data%3C/b%3E&pageName=Explore-Statistics&mainMenu=Home&subMenu=Explore-Data (consulted 
on April 9, 2014).  
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Price Index27, differentiating between states and rural/urban families. Spending on 
inpatient care has increased in both states, but the percentage increase was smaller 
in AP. We cannot credibly measure out-of-pocket payments as a share of total 
spending, or whether out-of-pocket spending is ‘catastrophic’ or ‘impoverishing’, 
because we do not have adequate data on total household spending in the 2004 
NSSO survey, which was a health-specific survey not a general household survey. 
What we can do is construct variables that capture whether inpatient care results 
in ‘large’ out-of-pocket spending. At the household level, we construct a variable 
that takes a value of one if the household incurred inpatient expenditures in excess 
of INR 22,500; this is around the average amount paid to providers by the 
Aarogyasri program for a hospitalization in 2012. We also report results for 
different thresholds, beginning at INR 15,000 and ending at INR 30,000 in steps of 
INR 2,500. The incidence of large payments has increased in both states, with AP 
recording the larger percentage increase; the difference between the states is much 
smaller for expenses in excess of INR 25,000. We also compute the household’s total 
outpatient expenses over the last 15 days; this has increased in AP but has fallen in 
MH. At the case-level, we have a variable that captures whether the admission 
resulted in positive out-of-pocket payments (this increased slightly in both states), 
and variables that capture net out-of-pocket spending associated with an admission 
(this increased in both states but less in percentage terms in AP) as well as the 
amount reimbursed (this fell in both states). In addition, we measure the 
27 All results in INR are given in 2004 values. 
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transportation costs associated with a hospitalization (this increased in MH but fell 
in AP).  
Our final outcome variables capture how households finance their inpatient 
care. We distinguish between the following four sources: (i) household income or 
savings; (ii) borrowing (with and without interest); (iii) contributions from relatives 
and friends; and (iv) “other” which includes selling and mortgaging of assets. The 
first two finance over 80 percent of inpatient care costs; both states saw an 
increased reliance on income and savings, but only AP saw an increase in reliance 
on borrowing. We are also interested whether the household had borrowed a ‘large’ 
amount to finance inpatient care; we use the same thresholds as we did with our 
‘large’ spending variables. Only AP saw a rise in the incidence of large borrowing. 
Both states saw increased reliance on contributions from family and friends to 
finance inpatient care, but the increase in MH was larger; both states saw a rise in 
reliance on mortgaging and selling of assets, but from a very small base.  
4.2. Covariates and stratifiers  
As mentioned above, the 2004 NSS survey has limited information on 
household consumption. Instead we capture a household’s living standards in our X 
vector through a wealth proxy (asset index) constructed using principal components 
analysis (PCA) on a vector of dwelling characteristics and amenities (cf. Filmer and 
Pritchett 2001). The vector includes the household’s source of drinking water, 
whether the water source is an ‘improved’ one, the type of energy used for cooking, 
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type of latrine, type of drainage and the structure of the house.28 The PCA was run 
on the pooled 2004 and 2012 data to ensure our index captures improvements in 
living standards between the two periods. We multiplied it by minus 1 to make it 
increasing in “wealth”, and the then constructed quintiles, again on the pooled data. 
Our wealth index puts AP average wealth lower than MH’s in both years, but gives 
AP the faster growth rate (the statistic in Table 6 is the mean value of the quintile 
variable). In addition to including the wealth quintile dummies in the X-vector, we 
also used it to stratify our sample to examine the differential excess growth in AP 
and MH among the poorest 40 percent and the richest 60 percent. In the X vector 
we also included a vector of dummies capturing India’s socioeconomic groups (our 
categories were scheduled tribe, schedule cast, other ‘backward’ casts, and other 
groups), an urban-rural dummy, and a dummy capturing whether the head of 
household was a female.   
5. Assessing the effects of Aarogyasri: Results 
Tables 7-9 present our estimates of AP’s excess growth in: (a) utilization of 
inpatient and outpatient care, expenditure on inpatient and outpatient care, and 
the methods of financing the costs of inpatient care. Each table shows – for the 
sample as a whole, and for the poorest 40 percent and richest 60 percent – the fixed-
effects estimate of the (additional) impact of the AP initiatives (i.e. AP’s excess 
28 Sources of drinking water include hand well, water tankers, pucca well, pond, canal and tab. Energy used for cooking was 
categorized as coke/coal/charcoal, fire, liquefied petroleum gas, biogas, dung cake and electricity. The type of latrine included 
flash system/septic tank, service, other and no latrine. The types of drainage included open kutcha, open pucca, covered pucca, 
underground, and no drainage. Structure of the house was divided in the categories homeless or living in kutcha structure 
and pucca or semi-pucca structure.  
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growth), holding constant the differential growth in X’s between the two states.29 
The last two columns show the fixed-effect estimate of the differential excess growth 
between the poorest 40 percent and the richest 60 percent, along with the t-statistic; 
a positive coefficient indicates that the excess growth of AP is pro-poor; a negative 
coefficient indicates that AP’s excess growth is pro-rich.  
5.1. Hospital admissions and use of outpatient care  
We find no significant differential growth between AP and MH in the 
probability of being admitted to hospital, but significant positive excess growth in 
AP (equal to 53 percent) in the number of admissions, even after controlling for 
differential growth in wealth, etc.; this faster growth in AP was seen among both 
the poor and the better off. AP also saw a significantly larger increase in the 
probability of being admitted to hospital for surgery but only among the poorest 40 
percent. AP saw significantly faster growth in some Aarogyasri-covered conditions 
including kidney problems, but there is variation across conditions in whether the 
excess growth was pro-poor, pro-rich or neither (e.g. in the case of fever it was pro-
poor, while in the case of kidney problems it was pro-rich). We see no significant 
excess growth in AP in either outpatient visits or the probability of being admitted 
to a private rather than a public facility. By contrast, even controlling for 
differential changes in the X’s, we see a faster reduction in average length of 
hospital stay in AP, with similar reductions among the poorest 40 percent and 
richest 60 percent.  
29 The numbers for the poorest 40 percent and the richest 60 percent were derived from a regression that included the 
Aarogyasri treatment variable interacted with a dummy indicating if the household was in the poorest 40 percent across both 
states and both years, i.e. in one of the bottom two quintiles.  
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Can the different health initiatives of the two states explain these results? 
The statistically significant excess growth in AP in the number of inpatient 
admissions per person is consistent with Aarogyasri covering a much larger fraction 
of the AP population than RSBY/RGJAY covers in in MH, and the higher growth in 
AP in surgery admissions is consistent with Aarogyasri being more focused on 
secondary and tertiary care (especially surgery) than RSBY. But part of the excess 
growth in AP may be explained by other health initiatives seen in AP but not in 
MH. The obvious ones are the ambulance service initiative, which aimed to reduce 
the transport cost to hospital for the AP population, and the AP mobile health unit 
initiative, which aimed to bring maternal and child health and non-communicable 
disease services closer to the population, and which may have increased health 
awareness and encouraged higher rates of hospitalization. Aarogyasri may also 
have played a part in AP’s negative excess growth in mean length of hospital stay: 
Aarogyasri, RSBY and RGJAY have all adopted per-procedure payment methods, 
but Aarogyasri had a much higher level of penetration in AP than RSBY and 
RGJAY had in MH, and has hence had enjoyed a larger increase in buying power. 
5.2. Expenditure on inpatient and outpatient care 
Table 8 shows the excess growth in AP in the amount of out-of-pocket 
spending, net of reimbursements and with negative estimated net expenditures set 
to zero after subtracting reimbursements. AP recorded smaller growth in total 
household out-of-pocket spending on inpatient care, even after controlling for 
differential changes in the X’s; this despite the fact that AP recorded significant 
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positive excess growth in hospital admissions per capita. The lower growth in AP, 
after controlling for differential growth of the X’s, was of the order of INR 500 (2004 
values), equivalent to 16 percent lower growth. Table 8 shows, however, that AP’s 
negative excess growth was concentrated largely among the richest 60 percent: 
among the poorest 40 percent, AP saw a smaller growth than MH, but the 
difference was not statistically significant. As was seen in Table 4, both AP and MH 
recorded increases in the incidence of ‘large’ out-of-pocket expenditures, but that 
when ‘large’ is defined as expenditure in excess of INR 23,000, and differential 
growth in the X’s is taken into account, AP recorded significantly smaller increases. 
This was all was concentrated among the richest 60 percent, however. AP saw 
significant negative excess growth in out-of-pocket spending on outpatient care, and 
that was evenly spread across the wealth distribution. In the case-level data, we see 
significant negative excess growth in AP in out-of-pocket payments per admission, 
but this too is concentrated among the better off. AP recorded significant negative 
excess growth in transport expenditures associated with inpatient care; again this 
was concentrated among the better off.  
How far can these results be explained by differences across the states in 
health initiatives? AP’s negative excess growth in out-of-pocket payments on 
inpatient care could be due to Aarogyasri covering a sizeable fraction of the 
population and covering their inpatient care costs for Aarogyasri-covered 
procedures. But it could also be due in part to people seeking care at an earlier 
stage for a broader range of conditions, believing that Aarogyasri will cover the 
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costs of treatment; this would raise out-of-pocket spending insofar as only some 
conditions are covered by the program, but a simpler case mix would limit this 
increase in out-of-pocket payments. Increased hospital competition in AP may also 
be a factor in slowing down the growth of inpatient care out-of-pocket spending. The 
slower rise in transport costs in AP likely reflects in part the effects of the 
ambulance program which had no analogue in MH. It may also reflect Aarogyasri’s 
policy of contributing toward the patient’s transport costs home, although this effect 
seems likely to have been small, given that only 11.3 percent of admissions are 
covered by Aarogyasri, and given our evidence of limited compliance on the ground. 
Finally, the negative excess growth in AP on outpatient expenditures could result 
from people in AP obtaining some outpatient care for free through Aarogyasri 
health camps. But it might also reflect people in AP seeking inpatient care for 
conditions that previously they would have sought outpatient care for.  
5.3. Sources of financing inpatient care costs   
Table 9 shows the differential growth in the two states in the sources of 
finance of inpatient care. As indicated in section III, the surveys ask how much of 
inpatient expenditures (including nonmedical expenditures associated with, for 
example, transportation) were financed from the different sources: (i) household 
income or savings; (ii) borrowing (with and without interest); (iii) contributions from 
relatives and friends; and (iv) “other” which includes selling and mortgaging of 
assets. As was seen in Table 5, both AP and MH recorded increased reliance on (i), 
(iii) and (iv), while AP (but not MH) saw increased reliance on borrowing. After 
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adjusting for differential changes in the X’s, AP emerges in Table 9 with 
significantly negative excess growth at the sample level on use of income and 
savings, and on contributions from relatives and friends, but not on selling and 
mortgaging of assets. There are some differences between the poorest 40 percent 
and richest 60 percent here: among the poorest 40 percent AP recorded significant 
negative growth in contributions from relatives and friends and on selling or 
mortgaging of assets but not on use of income and savings; by contrast, among the 
richest 60 percent the significant excess growth was on use of income and savings, 
and on contributions from relatives and friends. AP saw significant positive excess 
growth in borrowing to finance inpatient care, and this was concentrated among the 
poorest 40 percent.  
6. Conclusions  
Over the course of the last seven years, Andhra Pradesh (AP) has 
implemented several innovative health programs, the largest and costliest of which 
has been its Aarogyasri health insurance program, aimed at making life-saving 
inpatient care affordable for the majority of AP’s population.  
On many counts, the state has been successful. We estimate that 80 percent 
of AP families have a card that makes them eligible for Aarogyasri, close to the 
government’s claimed coverage rate of 86 percent; furthermore, as many as 70 
percent of families realize they are covered. We estimate that in 2012 Aarogyasri 
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financed around 11 percent of all hospital admissions, equivalent to around 520,000 
admissions, close to the government’s claimed figure of 434,000. Our survey data 
also gives us a very similar figure to that reported by the government for the share 
Aarogysari-financed admissions treated in public hospitals (33 percent according to 
our data); this is actually higher than the share of total AP admissions treated in 
public hospitals (24 percent according to our data). The rapid roll-out of Aarogyasri, 
the lack of monthly data immediately before, during and immediately after the full 
roll-out period, and the 80 percent coverage rate left us with no credible compelling 
identification strategy with which to estimate the impacts of the program. Instead, 
we compared the changes in AP with the changes in neighboring Maharashtra – a 
state that has introduced no at-scale health initiatives in the last 20 years that 
were not also introduced in AP. Our results on differential growth in the two states, 
adjusted for differential growth in confounders, are consistent with AP’s initiatives 
(and Aarogyasri in particular) raising inpatient admissions per capita and surgery 
admissions, and reducing the growth of out-of-pocket spending per inpatient 
admission, the latter to such an extent that growth of total out-of-pocket inpatient 
spending was also reduced. This change seems to be driven by a reduction in the 
growth of large expenditures on inpatient care in AP, consistent with the objective 
of Aarogyasri. We also find a reduction in average length of stay per hospitalization 
in AP that can be explained by people seeking care earlier or improved efficiency in 
hospitals.  
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Our results do, however, also suggest areas for improvement for Aarogyasri. 
The Aarogyasri benefit package is limited to less than 1,000 high-cost procedures, 
yet only one-quarter of the households who said they were covered by the program 
are aware of this fact; as many as 60 percent of those who said they were covered 
said that the scheme “covers all health issues”. Unsurprisingly there are some 
families who are denied financial support by Aarogyasri: around 14 percent, non-
coverage of the patient’s condition being the most common reason given (43 
percent). We find that people in AP still incur out-of-pocket spending during 
inpatient episodes they believed to be covered by Aarogyasri, that a majority of 
Aarogyasri-financed inpatients did not in fact receive the transport subsidy per the 
requirements of the program, and that less than 20 percent of people with 
knowledge about Aarogyasri had heard about the program’s army of health workers 
(known as ‘Aarogyamithras’) tasked with guiding patients through the inpatient 
admission and following up with them after discharge. Some of the areas in which 
AP and MH record differential growth also give cause for concern. AP’s slower 
growth in inpatient out-of-pocket expenditures was evident only among the better 
off; this may be a result of the significant increase in surgeries among the poorest, 
but it may also be due to poor people especially misunderstanding the limited 
nature of the benefit package and seeking hospital-based care for conditions they 
might previously have sought outpatient care for. For example, we find that poor 
people now are more likely to be hospitalized for malaria in AP.  
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These areas for improvement should not detract from the fact that 
Aarogyasri has high coverage and high awareness rates, and that the differential 
growth comparisons between AP and MH are consistent with Aarogyasri having 
contributed to higher surgery admissions and slower growth in out-of-pocket 
spending per hospital admission.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics on Aarogyasri  
 
 
Observations Percentages 
 Covered Not covered All Covered Not covered All 
Total no. households 6,143 2,480 8,623 71 29 100 
Eligible§  5,805 1,043 6,848 94.5 42.1 79.4 
 of whom possessing a BPL card 5,596 1,016 6,612 96.4 97.4 96.6 
In poorest quintile 727 99 826 11.8 4.0 9.6 
Richest quintile 798 520 1,318 13.0 21.0 15.3 
All household members illiterate 695 216 911 11.3 8.7 10.6 
Benefitting from Aarogyasri             
Has (directly) benefitted from Aarogyasri in some way 425 50 475 6.9 2.0 5.5 
Two poorest quintiles 128 6 134 2.1 0.2 1.6 
Two riches quintiles 363 39 402 5.9 1.6 4.7 
Inpatient episode covered by Aarogyasri 347 41 388 5.6 1.7 4.5 
Two poorest quintiles 92 6 98 1.5 0.2 1.1 
Two richest quintiles 177 24 201 2.9 1.0 2.3 
  of whom in private hospital 224 24 248 3.6 1.0 2.9 
  of whom in public hospital 123 17 140 2.0 0.7 1.6 
percentage in private of all Aarogyasri inpatients  64.5 58.5 63.9    
percentage in public of all Aarogyasri inpatients 35.4 41.5 36.1    
  of whom given cash for transport home 151 8 159 2.5 0.3 1.8 
  of whom given free food 185 12 197 3.0 0.5 2.3 
  av. out-of-pocket payments  9,262 9,823 9,296    Inpatient episode not covered by Aarogyasri 2,019 1,050 3,069 32.9 42.3 35.6 
Two poorest quintiles 1,721 967 2,688 28.0 39.0 31.2 
Two richest quintiles 892 678 1,570 14.5 27.3 18.2 
  of whom in private hospital 1558 796 2,354 25.4 32.1 27.3 
  of whom in public hospital 461 254 715 7.5 10.2 8.3 
percentage in private of non-Aarogyasri inpatients  77.2 75.8 76.7    
percentage in public of non-Aarogyasri inpatients 22.8 24.2 23.3    
Knowledge of Aarogyasri             
Knowledgeable about Aarogyasri program 3,761 1,123 4,884 61.2 45.3 56.6 
  of whom Aarogyasri-eligible 3,601 475 4,076 95.7 42.3 83.5 
  of whom knows Aarogyasri benefit package is limited 961 249 1,210 25.6 22.2 24.8 
  of whom knows about health camps 814 137 951 21.6 12.2 19.5 
  of whom has attended a health camp 421 54 475 11.2 4.8 9.7 
  of whom has heard of Aarogyamithras 609 94 703 16.2 8.4 14.4 
  of whom has interacted with an Aarogyamithra 97 7 104 2.6 0.6 2.1 
  of whom has heard about Aarogyasri call center 710 141 851 18.9 12.6 17.4 
  of whom has tried calling the center 39 3 42 1.0 0.3 0.9 
  of whom has had a complaint about Aarogyasri 248 88 336 6.6 7.8 6.9 
  of whom has registered a complaint 131 11 142 3.5 1.0 2.9 
  of whom complaint was resolved 118 10 128 3.1 0.9 2.6 
§ Possessing any of the following cards: BPL, AAY, Annapurna, or Aarogyasri.  
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Table 2: Health initiatives in Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra compared  
 
 Andhra Pradesh Maharashtra 
Aarogyasri-type 
program  
Over period April 2007 – July 2008, AP rolled out the 
Rajiv Gandhi Aarogyasri program across the entire 
state with an aim to cover close to 90 percent of the 
population. It covers 938 procedures up to INR 
200,000 per annum and family and is funded by the 
state government.    
From August 2011, MH started rolling out an Aarogyasri-type program known 
as Rajiv Gandhi Jeevandayee Arogya Yojana (or RGJAY). Intention is that 
RGJAY will replace RSBY (see below). As of 2013, RGJAY was present in only 8 
out of 35 districts . Program covers 972 surgeries/therapies/procedures along 
with 121 follow up packages in 30 identified specialized categories. It is financed 
by the state government and the benefits up to INR 150,000 per family per 
annum. It covered only about 0.04 percent of inpatient admission in MH in 
2012.  
Jeevandai 
Arogya Yojana 
 Implemented from 1997 and then modified to become Rajiv Gandhi Jeevandayee 
Arogya Yojana. Aimed to reduce high out-of-pocket spending on inpatient care 
among the BPL population and reimbursed services provided in public and 
private hospitals. The financial limit was initially INR 50,000 and extended to 
150,000 in 2006. A review carried out by the state government in 2012 found 
that awareness and use of the program was low.  
RSBY  Implemented in 32 out of 35 districts over the period 2008-2011, but withdrawn 
from six districts in 2011 as RGJAY (see above) was launched. Covered only 
around 1% of the MH population in 2012.30 
Ambulance 
service 
In early 2007, AP partnered with a private 
organization to ensure ambulance services for the 
entire population. In 2012, 802 ambulances catered 
to approximately 3,500 emergencies per day across 
the state.31 
Nothing similar in MH.  
Mobile health 
units 
In 2009, AP contracted a private organization to 
manage mobile health units for maternal and child 
health and chronic disease management across 
villages in the states. The district administration of 
the government has taken over the management of 
the mobile health units. 
Nothing similar in MH.  
Call center  AP contracted with a private organization to manage 
a call center (the “104 call center”), to provide free 
health care advice to everyone in the state. 
Aarogyasri has since taken over the call center 
services  
In 2011 MH introduced a call center to provide health care advice to the 
population.  
Navasanjeevani 
Yojana 
Nothing similar in AP.  Initiated in 1995-96 to reduce maternal and neonatal mortality in 15 tribal 
districts of MH. Matrutva Anudan Yojana is a program under the program 
30 See Thakur and Ghosh (2013). 
31 EMRI.  http://www.emri.in/states.html (consulted April 30, 2013). 
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where  pregnant women are paid INR 400 in cash for visiting health center for 
antenatal care 
Employees 
State Insurance 
Scheme (ESIS) 
Launched in 1952. Covers formal private sector employees in companies with more than ten employees and with earning up to INR 
15,000 per month and their dependents 
The program is administered by Employee’s State 
Insurance Corporation but the administration of most 
secondary and tertiary care services has been handed 
over to the Aarogyasri Healthcare Trust since end of 
2013. 
The program is administered by Employee’s State Insurance Corporation 
National Rural 
Health Mission 
The largest initiative in health care of the Indian government. Introduced in 2005 in all states. The main objective NRHM is to improve 
the maternal and child health in the country, and one of the most recognized initiatives is the introduction of community health workers 
in villages, Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHAs). Janani SurakshaYojana (JSY) is one other major program with the objective to 
increase institutional deliveries by providing INR 1,000 cash incentive to women that go for institutional deliveries. In 2011, the 
Government of India also launched Janani-Shishu Suraksha Karyakram (JSSK) to all states under the NRHM. The program is designed 
to ensure free and cashless service to pregnant women in normal deliveries and Caesarean sections and sick new born up to 30 days in 
Government health institutions rural and urban areas. 
 One program under the national Rural Health Mission that was introduced 
in MH but not in AP is the Maher Ghar Scheme. It was designed for safe 
deliveries in nine priority districts. The program has invested in 
infrastructure and guidelines for improved care.  
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Table 3: Use of services – descriptive statistics  
 
2004 
 
2012 
 
Change 
  
Change (%) 
  
 
MH AP MH AP MH AP DD MH AP DD 
          
Individual level 
          Hospital admission 0.041 0.031 0.043 0.037 0.002 0.006 0.003 5% 18% 13% 
No. times admitted to hospital in last 12 months 0.046 0.034 0.050 0.055 0.004 0.021 0.017 9% 60% 52% 
Admission for surgery 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.012 0.001 0.004 0.004 9% 54% 46% 
Admission for accident 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -8% -38% -30% 
Admission for malaria 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.001 108% 647% 539% 
Admission for fever 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.003 108% 520% 413% 
Admission for cancer 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -21% -62% -41% 
Admission for kidney condition 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 -24% 97% 122% 
Admission for cardiovascular condition 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 -3% 32% 35% 
Admission for Aarogyasri covered condition 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -15% 21% 36% 
           Outpatient visit in last 15 days 0.093 0.078 0.036 0.015 -0.057 -0.062 -0.006 -61% -80% -19% 
           
Case level 
          No. days in hospital last 12 months 7.460 10.450 6.932 6.976 -0.527 -3.474 -2.946 -7% -33% -26% 
Admitted to private facility  0.729 0.700 0.718 0.762 -0.011 0.062 0.074 -2% 9% 10% 
           
Notes: DD is double-difference, or difference-in-difference, i.e. the AP change less the MH change.  
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Table 4: Payments for health care – descriptive statistics  
 
2004 
 
2012 
 
Change 
  
Change (%) 
  
 
MH AP MH AP MH AP DD MH AP DD 
          
Household level 
          OOP exp. on IP care 1092 724 2034 1168 943 445 -498 86% 61% -25% 
IP spending > INR 15,000 0.037 0.019 0.062 0.040 0.025 0.021 -0.005 70% 107% 38% 
IP spending > INR 17,500 0.031 0.016 0.053 0.033 0.021 0.017 -0.005 67% 101% 33% 
IP spending > INR 20,000 0.025 0.013 0.048 0.030 0.023 0.018 -0.005 90% 138% 48% 
IP spending > INR 22,500 0.022 0.012 0.039 0.023 0.017 0.011 -0.006 80% 96% 16% 
IP spending > INR 25,000 0.019 0.011 0.035 0.020 0.016 0.009 -0.007 84% 88% 3% 
IP spending > INR 27,500 0.017 0.009 0.031 0.017 0.014 0.008 -0.006 82% 85% 3% 
IP spending > INR 30,000 0.015 0.008 0.030 0.017 0.014 0.008 -0.006 95% 98% 3% 
           OOP exp. on OP care 122 92 169 81 47 -12 -59 39% -12% -51% 
           
Case level 
          Positive OOP exp. for admission  0.930 0.927 0.966 0.947 0.037 0.019 -0.017 4% 2% -2% 
OOP payments during admission 6254 6225 9154 7267 2900 1042 -1858 46% 17% -30% 
IP admission spending reimbursed 4228 3115 390 383 -3839 -2732 1107 -91% -88% 3% 
Transport exp. w/ admission 278 463 470 417 192 -46 -238 69% -10% -79% 
           
Notes: DD is double-difference, or difference-in-difference, i.e. the AP change less the MH change. Out-of-pocket (OOP) spending on inpatient (IP) care shown here is net of 
reimbursement and truncated. OOP spending on IP care at household level refers to last 12 months. OOP spending on outpatient (OP) care at household level refers to last 15 
days.  
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Table 5: Sources of finance – descriptive statistics  
 
2004 
 
2012 
 
Change 
  
Change (%) 
  
 
MH AP MH AP MH AP DD MH AP DD 
          
Income or savings 620 269 1084 486 464 217 -247 75% 81% 6% 
Borrowing 357 322 344 484 -13 162 175 -4% 50% 54% 
Borrowing > INR 15,000 0.012 0.010 0.011 0.015 -0.001 0.006 0.007 -10% 57% 67% 
Borrowing > INR 17,500 0.010 0.008 0.011 0.015 0.001 0.007 0.006 7% 79% 71% 
Borrowing > INR 20,000 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.010 -0.001 0.003 0.004 -13% 50% 63% 
Borrowing > INR 12,500 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.010 0.000 0.004 0.004 -6% 59% 65% 
Borrowing > INR 25,000 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.008 -0.001 0.002 0.003 -8% 39% 47% 
Borrowing > INR 27,500 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.000 0.003 0.003 2% 67% 65% 
Borrowing > INR 30,000 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.006 -0.001 0.002 0.002 -15% 35% 50% 
Contributions from relatives and friends 164 52 403 106 240 54 -185 146% 105% -42% 
Selling or mortgaging of assets 0 3 42 12 41 9 -32 18792% 298% -18494% 
           
Notes: DD is double-difference, or difference-in-difference, i.e. the AP change less the MH change.  
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Table 6: Covariates – descriptive statistics  
 
2004 
 
2012 
 
Change 
  
Change (%) 
  
 
MH AP MH AP MH AP DD MH AP DD 
          
Wealth quintile 2.816 2.478 3.301 3.146 0.484 0.668 0.184 17% 27% 10% 
Scheduled tribe 0.094 0.059 0.137 0.103 0.042 0.044 0.001 45% 74% 29% 
Scheduled caste 0.147 0.204 0.214 0.211 0.067 0.007 -0.060 45% 3% -42% 
Backward castes 0.328 0.474 0.196 0.401 -0.132 -0.073 0.059 -40% -15% 25% 
Other groups 0.430 0.264 0.453 0.286 0.022 0.022 0.000 5% 8% 3% 
Rural 0.596 0.725 0.553 0.700 -0.043 -0.025 0.018 -7% -3% 4% 
Female headed household 0.071 0.096 0.134 0.117 0.063 0.022 -0.041 89% 23% -66% 
           
Notes: DD is double-difference, or difference-in-difference, i.e. the AP change less the MH change.  
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Table 7: Use of services – excess growth in AP 
 Sample   Poorest 40%  Richest 60%  Diff  
 FE t-stat % FE t-stat FE t-stat FE t-stat 
          
Individual level          
Hospital admission 0.002 0.41 6% 0.007 1.29 0.000 -0.06 0.007* 1.77 
No. times admitted to hospital in last 12 months 0.014** 2.09 53% 0.015** 2.33 0.013* 1.81 0.002 0.43 
Admission for surgery 0.003** 2.00 41% 0.005*** 2.73 0.002 1.44 0.002* 1.65 
Admission for accident -0.001 -0.88 -20% 0.001 0.73 -0.001* -1.76 0.002*** 2.70 
Admission for malaria 0.001 1.48 251% 0.002* 1.81 0.001 1.18 0.001 1.15 
Admission for fever 0.002** 2.30 238% 0.001 1.26 0.003** 2.42 -0.001 -1.23 
Admission for cancer 0.000 -1.01 -33% 0.000 0.25 0.000 -1.59 0.000** 1.99 
Admission for kidney condition 0.001** 1.98 148% 0.001 1.60 0.001* 1.90 0.000 0.28 
Admission for cardiovascular condition 0.000 0.20 7% 0.001 1.36 0.000 -0.25 0.001* 1.68 
Admission for Aarogyasri covered condition 0.001 1.02 29% 0.002** 2.21 0.000 0.43 0.001** 2.03 
Outpatient visit in last 15 days -0.006 -0.42 -8% 0.007 0.48 -0.012 -0.80 0.018** 2.47 
          
Case level          
No. days in hospital last 12 months -2.522*** -3.67 -24% -2.061*** -2.82 -2.735*** -3.46 0.674 0.89 
Admitted to private facility  0.042 1.08 6% 0.009 0.23 0.057 1.31 -0.048 -1.37 
          
 Notes: FE is fixed effect.  
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Table 8: Payments for health care – excess growth in AP 
 Sample   Poorest 40%  Richest 60%  Diff  
 FE t-stat % FE t-stat FE t-stat FE t-stat 
 
   
       
Household level          
OOP exp. on IP care -558.994** -2.29 -69% -178.523 -0.72 -734.02*** -2.82 555.500** 2.51 
IP spending > INR 15,000 -0.007 -1.01 -37% 0.002 0.28 -0.011* -1.66 0.014** 2.54 
IP spending > INR 17,500 -0.006 -1.03 -39% 0.001 0.19 -0.010 -1.63 0.011*** 2.59 
IP spending > INR 20,000 -0.008 -1.34 -59% -0.002 -0.32 -0.010* -1.76 0.008** 1.98 
IP spending > INR 22,500 -0.008* -1.74 -71% -0.001 -0.19 -0.012** -2.44 0.011*** 2.69 
IP spending > INR 25,000 -0.009** -2.14 -82% -0.002 -0.56 -0.01*** -2.70 0.009** 2.49 
IP spending > INR 27,500 -0.007* -1.91 -79% -0.001 -0.23 -0.01*** -2.61 0.009*** 2.72 
IP spending > INR 30,000 -0.008** -2.06 -92% -0.002 -0.45 -0.01*** -2.67 0.009** 2.44 
OOP exp. on OP care -71.316** -2.39 -77% -55.042** -2.37 -78.803** -2.14 23.760 0.74 
          
Case level          
Positive OOP exp. for admission  -0.023 -1.04 -2% -0.030 -1.22 -0.019 -0.87 -0.011 -0.72 
OOP payments during admission -2088.232** -1.99 -34% -1005.115 -1.03 -2588.868** -2.22 1583.754* 1.77 
IP admission spending reimbursed 1123.937 0.75 36% 1395.813 0.90 1012.365 0.69 383.449 1.09 
Transport exp. w/ admission -171.385** -2.01 -37% -105.686 -1.28 -202.670** -2.02 96.983 1.07 
          
Notes: FE is fixed effect. Out-of-pocket (OOP) spending on inpatient (IP) care shown here is net of reimbursement and truncated. OOP spending on IP care at household level 
refers to last 12 months. OOP spending on outpatient (OP) care at household level refers to last 15 days. 
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Table 9: Sources of finance – excess growth in AP  
 Sample   Poorest 40%  Richest 60%  Diff  
 FE t-stat % FE t-stat FE t-stat FE t-stat 
          
Income or savings -302.406** -2.13 -112% -117.891 -0.90 -387.29*** -2.64 269.397*** 3.58 
Borrowing 175.466* 1.65 54% 278.760** 2.05 127.947 1.16 150.813 1.27 
Borrowing > INR 15,000 0.007** 2.01 68% 0.009** 2.31 0.006 1.53 0.004 1.00 
Borrowing > INR 17,500 0.006* 1.89 71% 0.009** 2.40 0.004 1.30 0.005 1.28 
Borrowing > INR 20,000 0.004* 1.85 62% 0.01*** 2.62 0.003 1.10 0.004 1.45 
Borrowing > INR 12,500 0.004* 1.65 60% 0.007** 2.56 0.002 0.88 0.005* 1.67 
Borrowing > INR 25,000 0.003 1.21 43% 0.005** 2.06 0.001 0.57 0.004 1.51 
Borrowing > INR 27,500 0.003 1.40 61% 0.005** 2.13 0.002 0.79 0.004 1.36 
Borrowing > INR 30,000 0.002 1.26 50% 0.003* 1.70 0.002 0.84 0.002 0.94 
Contributions from relatives and friends -202.53*** -3.66 -390% -151.710* -1.88 -225.91*** -4.55 74.199 1.30 
Selling or mortgaging of assets -36.810 -1.64 -1220% -50.795** -1.98 -30.376 -1.41 -20.419* -1.87 
          
Notes: FE is fixed effect.  
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Figure 1: Trends in healthcare and Aarogyasri budgets in Andhra Pradesh 
 
 
Source: Nagulapalli and Rokkam (2013) 
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Figure 2: Trends in coverage of government sponsored insurance programs  
 
 
 
Source: Administrative data from Aarogyasri Trust, Government of Maharashtra and RSBY  
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